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Religious Marginality, Covid-19, and 
Redress of Targeting and Inequalities*†
Mariz Tadros,1 Maryam Kanwer2 and Jaffer Abbas Mirza3
Abstract This article interrogates whether we should consider 
‘religious marginality’ as a qualifier much like the exploration of 
how gender, ethnicity, and class inequalities are explored when 
examining Covid-19-related vulnerabilities and their implications 
for building back better. Drawing on a case study of Pakistan 
as well as evidence from India, Uganda, and Iraq, this article 
explores the accentuation of vulnerabilities in Pakistan and how 
different religious minorities experience the impact of the interplay 
of class, caste, ethnicity, and religious marginality. The article 
argues that where religious minorities exist in contexts where the 
broader political and societal policy is one of religious ‘othering’ 
and where religious marginality intersects with socioeconomic 
exclusion, they experience particular forms of vulnerability 
associated directly or indirectly with Covid-19 consequences that 
are acute and dire in impact. Building back better for religiously 
inclusive societies will require both broad-based as well as more 
specific redress of inequalities.
Keywords religious equality/inequality, freedom of religion or 
belief, Covid-19, leave no one behind, Pakistan, Iraq, Uganda, 
India.
1 Introduction
Does religious affiliation work in the same way as gender, 
class, and ethnicity as a qualifier in determining vulnerability to 
Covid-19 infection and in worsening pre-existing inequalities? 
What does building back better mean for fostering religiously 
inclusive societies? This article tackles these questions, drawing 
on the extensive scoping of the impact of Covid-19 on religious 
minorities and religiously marginalised groups undertaken by 
the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development 
(CREID). The article interrogates whether we should also consider 
‘religious marginality’ as a qualifier much like gender, ethnicity, 
and class when examining Covid-19-related vulnerabilities. 
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The article argues that belonging to a religious minority per se 
does not automatically translate into greater susceptibility to 
being negatively affected by the pandemic more so than other 
vulnerable groups in the community. However, where religious 
minorities exist in contexts where the broader political and 
societal policy is one of religious ‘othering’ and where religious 
marginality intersects with socioeconomic exclusion, they 
experience particular forms of vulnerability that are acute and 
dire in their consequences.
Section 2 elucidates the use of concepts such as religious 
minority, religious othering (see Tadros 2020), the methodology 
behind this article, and highlights some of the operational 
tensions in framing faith, religion, and religious equality in 
relation to the effects – direct or indirect – of Covid-19. Section 3 
highlights the dynamics of how several religious minorities, 
differently situated in Pakistan, were affected by Covid-19 
directly or indirectly. Section 4 draws empirical evidence on the 
intersection of religious marginality with socioeconomic and 
political inequalities from many contexts. Section 5 offers an 
analysis of the implications of these particular forms of targeting 
of religious minorities on social cohesion, security, and wellbeing in 
particular in terms of building back better.
2 Conceptual framing and operational tensions
Covid-19 is no equaliser. There are multiple ways in which Covid-19 
directly or indirectly has affected and been affected by existing 
power hierarchies and inequalities such as class, gender, 
geographic location, and ethnicity (UN 2020; Vogels et al. 2020; 
Blundell et al. 2020). Ethnicity, for example, in the UK has proven 
to be an important factor when exploring the disproportionate 
number of deaths experienced by people from black and minority 
ethnic groups (BAME). BAME people accounted for 11 per cent of 
those hospitalised with Covid-19 but over 36 per cent of those 
admitted to critical care (Butcher and Massey 2020).
Yet it seems that it is not being of an ethnic minority in and of 
itself that correlates positively with Covid-19 ‘targeting’; rather, 
the intersection of belonging to an ethnic minority with a 
number of other factors. Public Health England (2017) identified 
geographic location, inequitable access to health care, being 
disproportionately in public-facing occupations (such as frontline 
health workers), and historic racism. The latter means that where 
people are discriminated against in health care, they are less 
likely to seek health care or ‘as NHS staff are less likely to speak up 
when they have concerns about Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) or risk’ (Butcher and Massey 2020). The question is whether 
similar parallels exist for religious minorities in vulnerability to 
the detriments of Covid-19. To categorically determine such a 
question, we would need to have disaggregated data on religious 
affiliation and such data has not been collected whether for the 
UK or the contexts in which CREID has operated.
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The United Nations definition of ‘minority’ informs our own, as 
authors:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being 
nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population 
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language 
(OHCHR 2010: 2).
This definition is important in that it suggests that majority/
minority demarcation is not only based on numbers but a 
relationship of non-dominance; in other words, a relationship 
where large numbers of a religious group experience power 
inequalities. This is critical for our enquiry since empirically being 
a numerical minority is unlikely on its own to be a marker of 
increased vulnerability. For example, in Syria, the ruling regime 
headed by President Assad are Alawites, a religious sect within 
Shia Islam. Although they are a numerical minority (the majority 
are Sunnis), it is highly likely that their preferential access to 
political, economic, and health resources would put them in 
a less susceptible position than other religious groups in Syria 
(Chatty 2017).
However, where being a numerical minority intertwines with major 
power hierarchy differentials, the outcome can be exposure 
to targeting on account of being the religious other. Religious 
‘otherisation’ entails discriminating against those who share 
a different faith to the majority, not being ‘one of us’. Religious 
otherisation occurs when there is a narrowly defined conception 
of belonging such that having the same faith is considered a 
prerequisite for full membership in a community as an equal 
(Tadros 2020). Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights offers a broad and helpful definition of freedom of religion 
or belief:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance (UNGA 1948).
On account of the politicisation of the concept of freedom of 
religion or belief (Tadros and Sabates-Wheeler 2020), here we 
refer to religious equality and inequality. This allows us to examine 
how religious equality/inequality intersects with other qualifiers 
such as gender, class, ethnicity, and so forth. The case study 
on Pakistan in Section 3 shows clearly how such intersections 
are critical for our understanding of the interplay of religious 
marginality with other factors.
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In this article, our focus on religious marginality is not of the 
marginalisation of the religion itself, or its doctrine or precepts, 
but the people whose religious background makes them subject 
to marginalisation. The UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, Dr Ahmed Shaheed, cautions that the right to 
freedom of religion or belief belongs to individuals, not religions 
(Shaheed 2020). This differentiation is critical since we, as authors, 
and also as researchers in CREID,4 focus on subjects as excluded 
members of religious minorities, not defending their religions as 
such. The strength of CREID’s framing of religious inclusivity in 
terms of religious equality and not freedom of religion is manifest 
vis-à-vis the debates on Covid-19 and religion more broadly. 
In the US, some religious conservative groups (both Christian 
and Jewish Orthodox) have challenged official restrictions on 
mass gatherings on account of their infringement on freedom 
of religion. Such an appropriation of the term for political ends 
is deemed redundant when we replace the term ‘freedom of 
religion’ with ‘religious equality’. When public policy is applied to 
all religious groups, independently of the faith they follow, there 
is no infringement on the principle of religious equality. In other 
words, the importance here is the consistency with which it is 
applied to all faith groups to show government application of the 
principle of treating all groups of different faiths equally. We will 
now discuss this in the context of Nigeria and Iraq.
At the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, an active member of 
an indigenous faith in Nigeria contacted CREID with the view 
of promoting the idea that the restrictions on mass gatherings 
are harmful towards small indigenous religions because in the 
absence of the ability to practise their faith, adherents may join 
one of the two large Abrahamic religions followed in Nigeria. 
However, the same restrictions were imposed on followers of the 
two Abrahamic faiths, and CREID’s concern is for championing a 
redress of violations experienced against people of faith (and no 
faith) rather than ensuring that a religion is alive and well – even if 
such a religion was facing an existential threat.
In Iraq, there are a multitude of religions, including those that are 
despised and demonised by the majority Muslim population such 
as the Kaka’i faith, Zoroastrianism, and Sabaeans. In many cases, 
people have had to hide their faith on account of the intolerance 
displayed towards those who follow these religions which has 
led to an increasingly small pool of adherents in Iraq (Minority 
Rights Group 2018). However, in the context of Covid-19, the Iraqi 
government and Kurdish authorities in Kurdistan pressed people 
of all religious faiths to desist from participating in collective 
religious ceremonies because such gatherings increase the risk of 
those most susceptible to large-scale Covid-19 infections. Those 
that belong to the Kaka’i faith, whose followers have faced severe 
persecution, may feel that their religion is disproportionately 
affected since it is already a religion under attack. However, the 
Kaka’i leadership did comply with the restrictions on gathering:
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At the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, Nasradeen Haydari, 
the religious leader of the Yarsanis (which Kaka’is belong to), 
forbade all social and religious gatherings for his followers as 
a preventive measure. The Kaka’is in Daquq District heeded 
the call and have halted all social and religious gathering ever 
since… All social gatherings like weddings and birthdays have 
been halted. This is one of the social aspects of the effects of 
the Coronavirus pandemic on the religious minority, next to the 
health, economic and security aspects (Kirkuk Now).
The fact that the Kaka’is as a tiny sect will be deprived of 
practising a faith that is facing an existential threat is unfortunate. 
However, it should not be considered a right that people who 
follow the Kaka’i faith be given exemptions from the prohibition 
on mass gatherings because their religion is at risk. Ultimately, 
concern for the safety and health of the people of the Kaka’i faith, 
all faiths, and no faiths trumps concern for the preservation of the 
religion itself, as was demonstrated by the Kaka’i religious leader in 
the quotation above. Herein lies the distinction between protecting 
religious equality for a people and protecting the religion itself, 
even though the demarcations are not always so clear cut.
The research presented in this article draws on the work 
undertaken by CREID during February–September 2020 
in documenting the experiences of religious marginality 
intersecting with other inequalities as recorded by members 
of the communities, activists, researchers, and development 
practitioners. At the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, CREID 
asked its partners in some select countries (Pakistan and Iraq 
in particular) to document how their work with people living in 
religious marginality is being affected and how people’s lives are 
being shaped by the pandemic and how they are responding to 
it. Further, we sought documentation of the impact of Covid-19 on 
religious minorities from development practitioners based in other 
countries in which CREID has partners, such as India.
Much of this data have been published in the form of blogs; other 
findings are shared in papers which were still under peer review 
at the time of writing. The blogs are from India, Pakistan, Iraq, and 
Uganda, and some draw on other global contexts. The empirical 
evidence has been complemented with some secondary data 
analysis that primarily comprises grey literature in view of the 
limited academic scholarship on religious marginality and 
Covid-19 that was yet to be released at the time of writing. The 
dynamics of how Covid-19 has affected the status and situation 
of religious minorities were analysed, taking into consideration 
the presence of religious minorities of different faiths and their 
historical relations with the majority. However, they all experience 
vulnerability on account of the intertwining factors at hand.
The empirical case study on Pakistan is informed by primary 
data in the form of semi-structured interviews, stories, and a 
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survey. During Covid-19, we interviewed members of the Christian 
community in Lahore, Shia Hazaras in Quetta, and Hindus in 
Karachi through community interlocutors belonging to these 
communities. Section 3 also relies on the interviews and blogs 
produced by Ravadar.5 Ravadar’s information gathering included 
one-to-one and telephone semi-structured interviews with 
members of Christian, Hindu, and Shia communities living in 
Lahore (Punjab), Islamabad (federal territory), and Karachi (Sindh). 
The interviews were conducted by the interlocutors belonging to 
the same communities between August and October 2020.
The case of Pakistan was chosen on account of the diversity of 
experience and drivers of targeting towards the Shia minority 
which is rooted in political economy, as well as historical, 
ideological, and geostrategic factors. However, Pakistan is not 
an anomaly in how the official handling of Covid-19 and societal 
responses to the pandemic have accentuated the vulnerability of 
religious minorities to religious otherisation, as will be discussed in 
Section 3.
3 Pakistan
Muslims constitute 96.28 per cent of the population in Pakistan 
(PBS n.d.), of which Shias constitute 15–20 per cent (Rieck 2016: 
363). Religious minorities comprise: Christians 1.59–2.5 per cent 
(Mounstephen 2019: 20), Hindu 1.60 per cent, Ahmadiyya Muslims 
0.22 per cent, and Scheduled Caste 0.25 per cent, respectively 
(PBS n.d.). Although there are no official data on people of no faith 
or atheist, according to one survey conducted in 2012, 2 per cent 
of the people from the sample size of 2,705 identified themselves 
as ‘a convinced atheist’ (WIN-Gallup International 2012: 14).
Although the constitution of Pakistan guarantees protection 
to minorities, in the last 70 years, religious minorities in Pakistan 
have often been denied fundamental rights enshrined in the 
constitution. The declaration of Ahmadis as ‘non-Muslims’, 
the misuse of the blasphemy law against Christians, forced 
conversions of Hindus in Sindh, and violence against Shias are 
some of the examples of the persecution of religious communities 
in Pakistan.
Prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 in Pakistan, although terror 
incidents by religious militant groups against religious minorities 
had declined, the situation of religious minorities was disturbing. 
According to a report published on 16 March 2020, on religious-
inspired violence targeting religious minorities between July 2018 
and February 2020, there were an estimated 31 deaths, with 
58 people injured, and 25 blasphemy cases reported (Mirza 2020a). 
In the case of the Shia Hazaras in Baluchistan in the southwest 
part of Pakistan, their demonisation has been on account of the 
intersection of religious marginality with ethnicity, socioeconomic 
exclusion, and geographic locality. For example, in their vicinity, 
Covid-19 was referred to as the ‘Shia virus’ (Mirza 2020b).
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In the case of Hindus in Sindh Province, their ostracisation has 
been on account of religion, caste (belonging to the dalits), 
class (socioeconomically deprived), and geopolitics (the conflict 
between Pakistan and India). In the case of Christians in Pakistan, 
there are similar dynamics: while they too live in geographically 
deprived parts of the country, they also experience vilification 
on account of religion, caste (belonging to the dalits), class 
(socioeconomically deprived), and profession (they are associated 
with what society considers ‘dirty’ jobs such as cleaners and 
sewage workers).
3.1 Stigmatisation of Hazaras
Shia Hazaras, who mainly live in two areas, that is, Mariabad 
and Hazara Town, in Quetta, are one of the most persecuted 
religio-ethnic minorities in Pakistan. They have unique Mongolian 
features which make them easily identifiable among different 
ethnicities residing in Balochistan. According to official data, from 
2013–18, at least 509 Hazaras lost their lives (NCHR 2018: 2). The 
gruesome killings of Hazaras even forced the former chief justice 
of Pakistan, Saqib Nisar, to admit that the killings are ‘equivalent 
to wiping out an entire generation’ (Shah 2018).
In February 2020, Hazaras were in the news, but this time as 
culprits not victims. On 28 February, the Pakistani authorities 
had to re-open the borders for Shia Hazaras, returning pilgrims 
who were stranded on the Balochistan–Iran border as the 
virus engulfed Qom and Mashhad (two holy sites for Shias) on 
the other side in Iran (Aamir 2020). According to one report, 
only Shia pilgrims (both Hazara and non-Hazara Shias) were 
initially held in quarantine camps, and around 1,704 non-Shia 
and non-Hazara returnees such as traders and tourists were 
allowed entry after a minor temperature check (ibid.). Since 
Covid-19 cases were increasing in Mashhad and Qom, it seems 
authorities had assumed that the virus in Iran was only restricted 
to these two cities and, therefore, only Shias could be the 
carriers. Nevertheless, due to abysmal conditions in the camps, 
pilgrims were sent back to their respective provinces. However, in 
Balochistan, Hazaras – despite constituting a small proportion of 
the returnees from Iran (Changezi 2020) – were disproportionately 
targeted and stigmatised as the transmitters of the virus.
Even before the announcement of any lockdown in Balochistan 
or any study that mentions the ‘hotspots’ in the province, some 
public departments decided on their own to stop Hazaras 
coming to work. In one notification by the Inspector General 
of Police, Balochistan, policemen belonging to the Hazara 
community were asked not to come to work for two weeks, 
fearing they could transmit the virus (Akbar 2020). However, after 
pressure from the community and civil society, the Inspector 
General withdrew the notification on 12 March and instructed 
that only those policemen (including non-Hazaras) who came 
from Iran in the last 15 days should isolate.6 A similar notification 
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issued by the Water and Sanitation Authority had instructed the 
restriction of Hazaras in their two localities (Naya Daur 2020a). 
Eventually, the Chief Secretary, the most senior administrative 
authority in the province, announced that two Hazara areas 
would be cordoned off from the rest of the city (Daily Balochistan 
Express 2020). In private offices, public hospitals, and banks, 
Hazara employees were either sent on forced leave or asked not 
to come in (Mirza 2020b).
The government’s mishandling of the Covid-19 spread and the 
singling out of Hazaras seems to have influenced ordinary people, 
particularly their view of the Hazara community. In one of the 
unpublished surveys, we asked 100 non-Hazara people in Quetta 
if they thought the virus spread was due to Shia pilgrims coming 
from Iran. Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents answered 
positively while 25 per cent remained neutral or undecided. 
Though the sample is not an accurate representation of the 
entire city, it signals that some people still attach the stigma of 
the spreading of the virus to the whole Hazara community. As 
a consequence, Hazaras have been denied access to medical 
facilities as non-Hazaras have viewed the community as a 
potential transmitter of the virus (Aman 2020).
3.2 Unprotected and unpaid Christian frontline workers
The persecution of Christians in Pakistan is multilayered. They are 
either called or considered ‘dirty’ or ‘untouchable’ on account 
of the intertwining of religious marginality and caste, given that 
many belong to the dalit population. In Pakistan, they have, 
subsequently, been limited to sanitation or janitor jobs (Shoaib 
and Mirza 2019: 41). Moreover, Christians have been often framed 
with false blasphemy charges under 295-C of the Pakistan Penal 
Code XLV 1860.7 According to one source, there are around 
200 active blasphemy cases (Lehner and Pontifex 2019)8 against 
Christians and an estimated 40 of them are on death row 
(USCIRF 2018: 4).
On 29 March 2020, during a food relief drive, Christians were 
barred from receiving aid as one Sunni cleric instructed volunteers 
that the aid is for ‘Muslims only’ (Khokhar 2020). In another 
incident, a Christian woman confirmed in a video that she was 
asked to embrace Islam in order to receive food aid (Mirza 2020c). 
In Sandha Village in the Kasur district of Punjab, a Muslim man 
helped 100 Christian families who were initially denied aid, again 
on the instruction of a Sunni cleric, on the basis of their Christian 
identity (International Christian Concern 2020). The majority of 
these kinds of cases were not even formally reported; that is, 
where faith-based organisations were involved. Christians had 
complained that they were discouraged to apply for aid, as the 
aid was for Muslims only. In one case, one organisation even put a 
board out discouraging ‘non-Muslims’ to come to the tent where 
aid was being distributed (Mirza 2020c).
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Most of the sanitation workers in Pakistan (75–80 per cent) 
belong to the Christian community. Given their role as frontline 
fighters against the spread of the disease, scant attention has 
been paid to their safety and protection during the pandemic 
(Aqeel 2020). In one revealing report, when many were avoiding 
going near quarantine camps where Shia Hazaras were held, 
Christian sanitation workers were forced to go there with no PPE 
(ibid.).9 To accentuate their repression, they were compelled to 
work long hours while being denied the timely disbursement 
of their wages. Many of the Christian women, who mostly work 
as domestic helps or at beauty salons, were let go by their 
employers who were concerned that they were carriers of 
the virus. This occurred in places such as in Islamabad, where 
some Christian women, particularly those who worked as 
maids, had lost their jobs in the first wave of Covid-19 (Ravadar 
2020b). No consideration was made for their survival as they 
faced dispossession following their loss of income, which was 
compounded in many cases by the loss of income also faced by 
male members of their families.
3.3 Covid-19 accentuating unequal access to welfare benefits for 
Hindu women
Hindus experience multiple intertwining sources of vulnerability in 
Pakistan. Hindus are seen as ‘Other’, a group which is ‘different’ 
from Muslims.10 Where Hindus are dalits, they are ostracised on 
account of caste by non-dalit Hindus as well as the broader 
Pakistani society where caste and class prejudice is widespread. It 
is important to mention that Hindus in Pakistan exist in an uneasy 
situation where their loyalties always remain in question due to the 
neighbouring Hindu majority and Pakistan’s arch-rival, India. This 
mindset has often provided impunity to hardliners to discriminate 
against Hindus as some sort of revenge against India.
One of the Ravadar project’s ongoing investigations is exploring, 
at the onset of Covid-19, the economic loss of Hindu women 
vendors who sell mainly nuts and dry fruit at Empress Market 
in Karachi. In late April 2020, when the Sindh government 
announced a strict lockdown, financially marginalised groups, 
particularly daily wage earners, had no other option but to defy 
the rules and look for opportunities. Hindu women vendors, with 
no other economic opportunities, continued to set up their stalls 
in Empress Market. As a result, police raided and confiscated 
all their belongings. Later, when the government had eased 
restrictions, however, police did not return Hindu women their 
confiscated possessions, based on the testimonies given by six 
Hindu women. This has made them assetless and thrown them 
into debt because the assets had been purchased on loan 
(Ravadar 2020a).
There is concern that against the backdrop of the international 
community being fully preoccupied with a focus on countering 
Covid-19, political society in many countries will seize the 
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opportunity of attention being deflected elsewhere in order to 
push for a further religious homogenisation of society and politics. 
For example, in July 2020, the Punjab Assembly passed an 
anti-Shia bill, the Protection of Islam Bill (Malik 2020), which was 
promoted by MPA Muavia Azam, son of the late Azam Tariq who 
was the leader of an anti-Shia militant organisation, Sipah-e-
Sahaba Pakistan. The bill imposes the Sunni version of history on 
Shias (Mirza 2020d).
Similarly, a senior minister, Ali Muhammad Khan, openly called for 
the beheading of blasphemers (making reference to the Ahmadis) 
(Naya Daur 2020b). There is no concrete evidence that in the 
absence of Covid-19, the same policies would not have been 
advanced. However, the authors of this article interrogate the 
nature of the timing of their campaign with respect to the current 
precarious and volatile environment. The issues we have seen 
arising in the Pakistan case study are not isolated; they connect 
strongly with behaviours and responses to religious otherisation 
observed in other contexts around the world, as will be discussed 
in Section 4.
4 Accentuating religious inequalities and underlying drivers
The attribution of blame to religious minorities for infecting the 
religious majority with Covid-19 has been a centuries’ old process 
of associating pandemics and plagues with the presence or 
role of maligned religious or ethnic minorities. During the plague, 
thousands of Jewish communities were utterly decimated across 
Spain, France, down the Rhineland, and throughout Eastern 
Europe (Morthorst 2020). In Pakistan, the broader majority call 
Covid-19 the ‘Shia virus’ (as mentioned in Section 3). In India, 
Covid-19 has been called the ‘coronajihad’ by those who blame 
Indian Muslims for actively seeking to infect the Hindu community, 
and various other terms such as ‘bio-terrorists’ and ‘the Muslim 
virus’, among others (Nazeer 2020).
These are not simply words in circulation: their widespread sharing 
has a snowball effect, generating with each sharing more rumours 
and misinformation. Other than creating rifts and consolidating 
stereotypes, the snowballing of hate speech does spill over into 
acts of violence at a community level. In India, Nazeer (ibid.) notes 
a string of attacks, for example:
Another attack, caught on video, shows a Muslim being 
beaten up with a bamboo stick by a man asking him about 
his conspiracy to spread virus. In Gorakhpur, Abdulrahman, a 
muezzin (one who calls to prayer), was attacked and assaulted, 
along with others who came to his rescue, for continuing the 
call prayer during the lockdown. In Humnabad, Imam Hafiz 
Mohammed Naseerudin believed he was assaulted by a police 
officer because he ‘looked Muslim’ and was blamed for the 
spread of the disease (ibid.).
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The terms used and accusations made while these Muslims were 
attacked are exactly those that have been in circulation on social 
media.
The question is, what drives this blaming and vilification? It is 
difficult not to see this phenomenon as the interface between 
historically cumulative tensions seething under the surface and 
the political opportunity seized by power holders to shift the 
blame from themselves to a religious minority that is already 
despised. In other words, when people are looking for answers 
to difficult questions such as why a pandemic is happening, 
and who is responsible for it, power holders may find it easier 
to deflect attention from giving account of their own actions/
policies by participating in the blaming of a despised group. For 
example, one Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader, Suresh Tiwari 
from Uttar Pradesh in India asked Hindus to boycott the purchase 
of food from Muslims: ‘Do not buy from Muslims’ as they ‘infect 
vegetables with saliva’ to spread the virus (ibid.).
If the health hazards associated with Covid-19 and the economic 
costs to the population at large deepen, the temptation to 
blame religious minorities for people’s suffering may increase. 
This may have serious ramifications for social cohesion and for 
spillovers of violence. Building back better can only happen if the 
power holders arrive at the conclusion that using the mobilisation 
of hate tactics may contribute to an escalating situation. 
Building back better requires the identification of perpetrators of 
rumours and hate speech and holding them to account, but it 
also requires a more systemic handling of actors who have been 
emboldened by the Covid-19 crisis to express and act on their 
visions of religious-inspired supremacy, such as the Hindutva 
movements in India.
4.1 Differential access to health information and services
Responding to the Covid-19 pandemic independently of how 
socially cohesive countries are, or the nature of the kind of 
inequalities they experience, ultimately requires the forging 
of a common narrative around the idea that everyone is 
susceptible, and only when we recognise our interdependence 
can we organise a concerted effort to address the pandemic 
(Tadros 2020). In many countries, leaders have called upon 
representatives of stakeholders to join in consultations on how to 
address this international pandemic. However, who is included 
and excluded on the list of official invitations to consultations 
is often simultaneously reflective of prejudices as well as power 
hierarchies.
In Uganda, in response to the Covid-19 crisis, President Yoweri 
Museveni held a consultative meeting with the leaders of 
Uganda’s major religions, under the umbrella of the Inter-Religious 
Council (IRC) of Uganda. Yet the officially recognised IRC is 
exclusionary, acknowledging only seven of the main religions 
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practised in Uganda and excluding others, such as many of the 
indigenous religions (for example, groups who live in the Rwenzori 
Mountains and who believe the mountains to be the home of their 
god Kitasamba) as well as smaller groups such as the Baha’is 
(Muhumuza and Kaahwa 2020).
Smaller religious minorities have been excluded from platforms 
such as the radio, where allotments of radio time have been 
accorded to other religious groups to disseminate messages and 
information to their followers on protective measures against 
Covid-19 and how to get help. In a context where collective 
action is deeply circumscribed, there has been an absence of 
official endorsement to smaller religious minorities to extend 
community outreach, with the health and economic measures 
needed to deal with the effects of Covid-19, and which in 
contrast, have been accorded to larger religious groups.
This official prejudice may have been reflective of the absence 
of political clout of smaller religious groups rather than an 
ideological position per se. However, its outcome is likely to be 
far-reaching. Not only does it circumscribe efforts to contain 
Covid-19, but it is likely to create deep fissures within communities 
around equality and inclusion. Building back better necessities 
creating more inclusive representative platforms and spaces, 
as well as a collective effort to ensure that at all levels of 
engagement, those on the margins of mainstream religions are 
accorded the same recognition, representation, and access to 
participation.
Class and income inequalities have always affected people’s 
access to information and health services independently of 
their faith or non-faith. However, in many contexts, this also 
intersects with religious affiliation when citizenship experiences 
are mediated by whether the person belongs to the religious 
majority or minority (Leach and Tadros 2014). In Iraq, where the 
health system has already been run down by decades of conflict 
and instability and shortage of funds, responding to a pandemic 
of this scale puts immeasurable pressure on frontline workers 
responding to the needs of the population at large. While all 
Iraqis suffered, there were particular groups who experienced 
a distinct set of intersecting vulnerabilities on account of their 
positioning in Iraq.
Iraqis living in camps for displaced persons are disproportionately 
composed of religious minorities who were displaced from 
their homes with the onslaught of ISIS. There are 86 camps for 
displaced persons in Iraq, in which some families have been 
living for the past five years and others for longer (Aziz 2020). The 
absence of the most elementary rule of law and security has 
meant that it has been several years now that they have been 
living in these camps. The response to Covid-19 has affected 
Iraqis living in camps for displaced persons in very distinct 
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ways because unlike other Iraqis who could at least travel to a 
pharmacy or health clinic in their vicinity, those in camps have 
been unable to travel outside them because of a strict curfew 
enforced on their mobility.
In a context of a severe shortage of health supplies and 
sometimes the existence of only one health clinic in the camp 
serving several thousands, this has further accentuated displaced 
people’s suffering on account of its accentuation of pre-existing 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Building back better necessitates 
going beyond making masks available in camps for displaced 
persons or building a new health clinic. It fundamentally requires 
dealing with the political economy drivers and security deficits 
that have led to thousands of Iraqis living in these camps. It 
means providing safety and security to displaced citizens so that 
they can rebuild their lives and livelihoods in areas where they 
presided prior to the onslaught of ISIS.
5 Concluding reflections: nuancing the debates
In response to Covid-19, the role of religious repertoires11 becomes 
very important, not least in terms of the role of faith leaders in 
shaping faith adherents’ responses to the disease or in the role 
of faith for sense-making and resilience. However, discourses 
of religious supremacy – the assumption that adherence to 
a particular religion places followers in a privileged position in 
comparison to non-followers with respect to susceptibility – run 
counter to ideas of humanity’s interdependence in overcoming 
Covid-19 (Tadros 2020). On the other hand, we have also 
witnessed many leaders of all faiths encouraging followers 
to draw on religious heritage traditions of adaptation and 
innovation in order to practise their faiths while adhering to the 
‘new normal’ in protective measures (ibid.). Religious leaders who 
follow the same religion, and sometimes the same denomination 
in the same context, at the same point in time, can draw on 
repertoires of a religious nature to endorse contradicting positions 
on responding to Covid-19. Hence, the issue is not whether religion 
in and of itself is anathema to countering Covid-19, since there 
are religious repertoires in the form of doctrine, tradition, and 
practices that can be appropriated for all kinds of messages in 
relation to Covid-19.
Yet if building back better necessitates taking the 
interconnectedness of humanity seriously, then religious 
inequalities need to be brought into the equation, much like we 
engage with ethnic, class, or gender inequalities. In fact, the 
prospects of building back better are most enhanced if religious 
inequalities are examined in their relationship or interplay with 
these other inequalities. The scapegoating of religious and 
ethnic minorities for the presence and spread of the pandemic 
(as was illustrated in calling Covid-19 the ‘Shia virus’ in Pakistan 
or ‘coronajihad’ in India) suggests that building back better will 
require much more than a set of health interventions to contain 
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the devastation caused by the pandemic. Another form of 
devastation is at stake, and that is the escalation into communal 
violence and ruptures in social cohesion. As long as power holders 
consider blaming religious minorities as a way of gaining popular 
support or as a way to deflect attention from their own failures, 
the prospects of building back better will be far removed.
The experiences of different religious minorities in Pakistan 
described in this article shed light on the multiple ways in 
which religious marginality intersects with pre-existing political, 
economic, and social inequalities. The intersection of religious and 
ethnic marginality in the case of the Hazara Shias was amplified 
in responses to Covid-19, with discourses and practices that treat 
them like ticking bombs, a concept altogether common historically 
in political projects aimed at eliminating peoples under the pretext 
that they are the carriers of disease. It may be argued that, in 
the case of Christians in Pakistan, it is the intersection of religious, 
class, and caste marginality that has meant that the Pakistani 
government has treated them like disposable human beings.
The historical assignment of poor dalit Christians in Pakistan 
to low-paying socially stigmatised cleaning professions was 
further amplified under Covid-19 as they were pressed to assume 
frontline work – without the PPE gear needed to protect them. 
The impact is not only in terms of heightened vulnerability to 
infection, but psychological: the notion that they do not deserve 
the credit, recognition, or resources to undertake roles that 
no one else will touch. The intersection of religious and caste 
marginality for the Hindus of Pakistan also exposed ways in which 
their pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerability placed them in 
a position where access to resources to mitigate the negative 
economic effects of Covid-19 became subject to conditional food 
for abandonment of their faith practices.
These examples from Pakistan, Iraq, and Uganda show 
that building back better will also necessitate new forms of 
accountability. First, regarding the government narrative around 
the drivers of the pandemic and how to contain it. It must show 
a zero-tolerance policy for those that engage in blaming and 
singling out minorities (religious or otherwise) for the spread of a 
pandemic and for its prevalence among its ranks, be they senior 
or junior.
Second, there needs to be a dissemination of a counternarrative 
to hate speech against religious minorities for all those committed 
to social justice within civil society. International development 
actors engaging in political economy analysis of inclusion/
exclusion in society and vulnerability to pandemics need to 
be mindful of religious marginality in religiously heterogenous 
communities where there are religious inequalities. It starts with 
international development actors asking questions such as: 
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 l ‘To what extent have the religiously marginalised been 
consulted on measures to ensure that no one is left behind?’; 
 l ‘To what extent are measures to mitigate vulnerability taking 
into account spatial, ideological, and socioeconomic barriers 
to adequate community outreach?’; and 
 l ‘To what extent is the broader increased suffering of a 
population potentially going to spill over into blaming religious 
minorities and potentially spilling over into violence?’.
It is important to note that religious minorities’ vulnerability to 
experiencing Covid-19 effects in an amplified manner is often 
on account of indirect international or government actions. In 
other words, addressing hardships of socioeconomically excluded 
religious minorities requires more than a compartmentalised 
approach. It necessitates exploring, for example, the degree 
of social spending by a government in general on education, 
health, and welfare in times of precarity; of how the health system 
as a whole functions and is equipped for crises; and how it is 
supporting those with precarious livelihoods.
These broader sets of policies in and of themselves, unless they 
are sensitive to religious inequalities, may miss the mark of 
affecting those experiencing religious marginality. Conversely, 
policies under a ‘new normal’ that do not shield the vulnerable 
are most certainly going to have religiously marginalised 
members of the community, as well as having the unintended 
consequence of increasing the blaming of religious minorities for 
hardship. Any new normal will have to simultaneously address the 
wellbeing concerns of all the population, as well as engage with 
policies that directly address the specificity of the vulnerabilities 
of religious minorities where they exist.
Notes
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